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The mode of narration appropriate to absolute music, that is, “pure instrumental music without 
text, title, programme, dramatic setting, or any other extraordinary music apparatus” (Kivy 
2009, 157), has been a matter of controversy in contemporary Anglophone philosophy of music 
for some three decades. Musicologist Anthony Newcomb put the issue succinctly: 
 
A large component of most music lies in its power […] to delight with its patterns in 
sound. (Hanslick likened music to the arabesque and the kaleidoscope.) But in some 
music these patterns seem to force upon some of us recognition of meaning connected to 
other aspects of our life – of a representational and expressive power. (Newcomb 1997, 
132) 
 
The crux of the problem is the conviction, which germinated in Eduard Hanslick’s seminal 
treatise On the Musically Beautiful (Hanslick 1986 [1885]), that pure instrumental music lacks 
representational, narrative, semantic, or other extra-musical content, hence whatever meaning 
such music has consists in what Richard Wollheim (1987, 45) called “the much maligned 
property of the decorative.” Yet arguably, such extra-musical content, and accordingly, the 
power of music to be “about” such content in some sense, seem to play a prominent role in our 
understanding and appreciation of pure instrumental music and seem vital to the value that it 
holds for us. Without extra-musical content we are left with pure repetitive form. The problem 
concerning the mode of narration appropriate to absolute music patently relates to the unique 
unfolding of such music qua “the fine art of repetition,” to use the catchy title of a book by 
Peter Kivy (1993a). It is not at all clear how we might explain why and how pure repetitive 
patterns of sound relate to our lives, or whether we can do so at all. 
 
In this paper we probe this problem in the somewhat unexpected context of Kendall Walton’s 
theory of ornamentality. In his seminal book, Mimesis as Make-Believe (1990), and in a number 
of other papers (1986; 1988; 1994; 1999; 2011; 2012), Walton carefully integrated the art of 
music into his theory of the representational arts, arguing that not only bona fide instances of 
programme music, but also works of so-called absolute music are thoroughly capable of 
generating fictional truths by engaging the listeners with props in introspectively imaginative 
games of make-believe. Hence our discussion in this paper is bound to read Walton against the 
grain. Yet one of the philosophically attractive features of Walton's theory of make-believe is 
the way that it is couched in terms of imaginative transactions with artifacts, placing homo 
ludens in the limelight. Walton gives unusual precedence to the experiencing subject – what 
would she identify as props, and how would she use them in appropriate games of make-
believe? In our discussion we will tap into this essentially Waltonian intuition in order to show 
that a possible remedy for the problem concerning the mode of narration appropriate to absolute 
music can actually be found in his fruitful ideas on ornamentality. 
 




For an elegant initial setup for our discussion we turn to a famous passage from E. M. Forster's 
novel Howards End, which Peter Kivy wittily invoked in his book Music Alone (Kivy 1990). In 
this passage, four characters are listening to Beethoven's fifth symphony, “the most sublime 
noise that has ever penetrated into the ear of man” (Forster 1963 [1910], 31). Two of the 
listeners in that scene – Helen Schlegel and her younger brother Tibby – are of particular 
importance for Kivy as well as for our present concerns, since they exemplify seemingly 
incompatible types or modes of listening to music. Helen – “who can see heroes and shipwrecks 
in the music’s flood” (31) – dwells on imaginative introspection; Tibby – “who is profoundly 
versed in counterpoint, and holds the full score open on his knee” (31) – savors tönend-bewegte 
Formen. For Kivy, an eminent advocate of formalism, this sharp contrast between Helen-type 
listening and Tibby-type listening ultimately means that Helen cannot really be a pure listener 
“of the work.” Rather, Helen-type listening is a case of attending an amalgamation of the music 
per se with the listener’s own imaginative, introspective, often unruly contribution. Since, 
according to Kivy (1990, 91), “our enjoyment of music is of cognitively perceived musical 
sound,” only Tibby-type listening is justifiable as a genuine experience of pure instrumental 
music. 
 
To be sure, postulating the mutual exclusivity of these two types of listening is unwarranted. 
Indeed, under the pressure of criticism, Kivy eventually withdrew his original claim concerning 
the unique authenticity of Tibby-type listening, admitting that neither his metaphysical nor his 
consequentialist strategies in Music Alone for establishing the claim that “pure” music requires 
“pure” listening are viable (Kivy 1993b). However, we may still regard the Tibby-Helen 
distinction as opening up, and charting, a continuous rich spectrum of congruent modes of 
listening. Thus, our investigation is driven by the following initial questions: (1) Can Walton’s 
theory of make-believe accommodate such a continuum? (2) How may such accommodation 
intervene in the current philosophical debate concerning the problem of absolute music? 
 
 
1. Formalism and narrativism 
 
Let us begin by situating our discussion vis-à-vis the current debate on the subject. In 
Antithetical Arts: On the Ancient Quarrel between Literature and Music (2009), Peter Kivy 
portrayed the current philosophical divide concerning the problem of absolute music as a 
watershed in aesthetic thought between two opposing traditions about how to understand music: 
formalism and narrativism. According to Kivy, whereas formalists insist that musical meaning 
inheres solely in the formal features of “music alone,” narrativists are actually literary 
interpreters of absolute music. They employ a literary analogy in order to attribute meaning to 
pure instrumental music, perhaps even to render absolute music as akin to literary art. Like 
Helen, they see heroes and shipwrecks in the music’s flood: disembodied actions of 
indeterminate agents. And Forster’s original choice of words, employing the verb to see rather 
than to hear, is actually philosophically important here, because (Kivy argues) this is precisely 
the problem: We don’t really hear heroes and shipwrecks in the music’s flood, but rather, quite 
figuratively, we behold such things in imagination or perceive them mentally, against the 
music’s flood. 
 
The most popular form of present-day narrativism is the “persona theory.” The main idea of this 
theory was first voiced by the musicologist Edward T. Cone (1974, 94), who claimed that “any 
instrumental composition, like the instrumental component of a song, can be interpreted as the 
symbolic utterance of a virtual persona.” Variants of the persona theory were subsequently 
developed and defended independently by Jerrold Levinson (1990, 306–335) and by Jenefer 




Robinson (2005). Such theories commonly postulate some sort of indefinite persona in the 
music, which is supposed to serve as a hinge for our deeply felt interest in pure instrumental 
music. The idea is that just as narrators in literary works express beliefs, attitudes, intentions, 
and emotions by means of the words of the text, musical personae express emotions (feelings, 
attitudes) by means of the sounds (or “gestures”) of the music. So listeners’ experiences, like 
those of readers, involve something like recognizing and responding to another person, one who 
experiences and expresses the emotion in question. As Kivy pointed out, the musical persona 
performs two functions for the narrativist:  
 
[T]o give absolute music a fictional content that is supposed to account for its artistic 
substance and interest, at least in part; and to explain how absolute music is capable […] 
of arousing what I have been calling the “garden-variety” emotions […] (Kivy 2009, 101) 
 
From the formalist’s point of view, the persona theorist wishes to take an easy way out of the 
problem concerning pure instrumental music (Kivy 2002, 113–119; 2009, 101–117). Persona 
theory may seem to fare better in explaining why we consider pure instrumental music valuable, 
or at least it seems to be able to do so more naturally, but only on pain of allowing the 
uncontrollable overpopulation of the canon of pure instrumental music with shadowy musical 
personae. The problem is that we cannot individuate such musical personae from one another or 
re-identify any of them over time in any clear sense. The analogy with the literary model runs 
out of steam when we come to realize that characters in literary fiction are interesting because 
they are concrete individuals with relatively rich personal histories who are situated in relatively 
detailed circumstances; they are not abstract entities, or “empty suits,” as Kivy (2002) calls 
them. In the last analysis, musical personae may possess very few fictional resources to hold our 
interest or to move us emotionally. 
 
Moreover, construing musical personae as hinges for our emotional involvement with pure 
instrumental music may involve a number of misconceptions and ambiguities. For instance, 
Walton (2011, 459) made the general point that “on the persona hypothesis, expression turns 
out to be a species of representation: Music represents itself as someone’s expression of 
feelings, as a story represents itself as someone’s reports of a series of events.” This eventually 
muddies some important distinctions between stories and pure instrumental music. But even on 
their own terms, persona theories seem to falter. Kivy (2009, 107–108) pointed out that in 
Levinson’s account we always feel the same emotion that the musical persona is supposed to be 
expressing. Characters in literary fiction do not restrict our responses in this way. This might be 
a result of misconstruing the concept of empathy as mirroring in the sense of taking on the 
emotion of the persona,
1
 rather than in the sense of reacting to his or her emotion with a 
different emotion. Robinson’s (2005) “new Romantic theory of expression in the arts” follows 
in the footsteps of Robin George Collingwood (1964 [1938]) by maintaining that readers and 
listeners take on, experience for themselves, or “recreate in imagination” the emotion they 
observe in the narrator or persona of an expressive work. However, such a conception might be 
open mutatis mutandis to the charge, which has already been effectively leveled against 
Collingwood’s original theory, that a work of art can have expressive qualities without there 
necessarily being a prior act of expression by an (implied) artist.
2
 Stephen Davies (2003) made 
the important point that the listener projects the purported persona onto the work after the 
emotive content has already been recognized; hence the musical persona is hardly an essential 
precondition of expressive hearing. 
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2
See Tormey 1971. 




The arguable demise of the persona theory notwithstanding, Kivy’s own enhanced formalism 
seems to fare no better in explaining why, and how, the empty pleasure of pure instrumental 
music could be valuable in itself. While the persona theorist may have taken an easy way out, 
the formalist seems adamant to push things to a state of gridlock. Kivy invariably insists that we 
cannot explain the appeal of absolute music by appealing to its narrative content, because if it 
has narrative content then it isn’t absolute music qua an art of purely abstract but perhaps 
expressive sound.
3
 In Antithetical Arts Kivy attempted to account for the value that pure 
instrumental music holds for us by observing a kinship between the kind of “morally uplifting 
experience” which such music affords, and the inexplicable notion of mystical experience 
pertaining to aesthetic emotion which Clive Bell (1958 [1914]) promulgated a century ago: 
“[W]hat strikes me about Bell’s descriptions of his ‘aesthetic emotion’ are how closely they 
resemble the kind of ecstatic experience of absolute music I have been trying to describe […]” 
(Kivy 2009, 249). In fact, Kivy seems to have aligned himself even more closely with another 
Bloomsbury aesthetician, Roger Fry (1920, 199), who maintained that “those who experience 
[aesthetic emotion] feel it to have a peculiar quality of ‘reality’ which makes it a matter of 
infinite importance in their lives.” Fry did not shy from the ultimate conclusion: “Any attempt I 
might make to explain this would probably land me in the depths of mysticism.” 
 
Following a certain reading of Bell by Nicholas Wolterstorff, Kivy appeals to the religious 
overtones and allusions in Bell’s language in order to bathe the empty pleasure of pure 
instrumental music in profundity. There is no doubt that the members of the Bloomsbury group 
saw a very close and deep connection between ethics and aesthetics. Yet this connection derives 
primarily from the conceptual construal of the idea of significant form. Jaakko Hintikka (1995) 
pointed out that the aesthetics of Bell and Fry was suffused in the epistemology of George 
Edward Moore, which was predominant in Bloomsbury. The idea that significant forms are the 
basic objects of aesthetic experience was invariably connected with the idea that objects of 
acquaintance are the basic data of epistemological experience. Hintikka’s point is that 
significant form is actually analogous to a sense-datum as an object of immediate experience. It 
is an objective entity; it is not an object (form) that merely appears beautiful, but is rather what 
we experience as beautiful. However, such aesthetic objects cannot be identified with 
perceptual objects (patterns of color on canvas) or with the perceptual sense-data whose being 
consists in exhibiting those patterns. To do so would be to commit the naturalistic fallacy. 
“Hence,” Hintikka (1995, 23) concludes, “an object of an aesthetic experience must according 
to Fry or Bell have intrinsic properties other than perceptual or geometrical ones. It must 
intrinsically be a bearer of certain values. This is what the Bloomsbury critics express by saying 
that a significant form must have moral and spiritual values.” 
 
Thus, there was nothing religiously mystical about the kind of object to which the Bloomsbury 
aestheticians attributed the aesthetic emotion. The moral and spiritual values possessed by a 
significant form are intrinsic properties of what is seen or otherwise perceived in a work of art. 
The lesson to be learned from this brief historical excursion is that Kivy cannot seriously take 
recourse to the religious or otherwise mystical overtones of Bell's (or Fry’s) idea of the aesthetic 
emotion without also admitting the much contested conceptual presuppositions of early-
twentieth-century British realism, which served as the ultimate philosophical justification for 
splicing aesthetics and ethics in Bloomsbury. We remain skeptical whether Kivy would be 
willing to mount a defense of Moore’s epistemology for this particular purpose. 
 
Our survey of the current debate remains incomplete, but it is now full enough to observe the 
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contours of the debate. As things stand, the debate on both sides of the fence seems to have 
backtracked unwittingly into problematic philosophical presuppositions of yore, at least in the 
cases of Robinson and Kivy. Nonetheless, each side seems to capture something important 
about our experience of pure instrumental music. Champions of Helen-type listening are keen to 
retain the insight so beautifully expressed by Ludwig Wittgenstein (1980, 73): “For me this 
musical phrase is gesture. It insinuates itself into my life. I adopt it as my own.” But, as Stephen 
Davies (2003, 168) observed, while the imaginary narrative of the progress of the musical 
persona is indeed possible, it follows, and only contingently, the grasping of the music’s nature, 
the recognition of its unity, integrity, symmetry, and so forth, upon which the narrative 
projection is cast. So Helen cannot do without Tibby. Champions of Tibby-type listening are 
keen to retain the equally important insight that music actually delights us with its patterns in 
sound. Yet Tibby might not attain profundity without Helen. To quote again from Wittgenstein 
(1980, 70): “Understanding music is a manifestation of the life of humankind.” 
 
 
2. The Tibby-Helen continuum 
 
We shall now proceed in a direction which might appear counterproductive at first, especially 
against the backdrop of our discussion in the previous section. We shall focus on understanding 
pure instrumental music in terms of musical ornamentality. 
 
As noted before, such an understanding of pure instrumental music has been a hallmark of 
formalism at least since Hanslick, and presumably even as early as Kant (1952 [1790], 72), who 
suggested ranking “fantasias (without a theme), and indeed, all music that is not set to words” in 
the same class with “designs à la grecque, foliage for framework or on wallpapers.” Hanslick 
famously argued in On the Musically Beautiful that a certain kind of ornamentation in the visual 
arts may afford a serviceable image of how music is able to produce beautiful forms without 
specific feelings as its content. “[L]et us think,” he wrote (Hanslick 1986 [1885], 29), “of an 
arabesque not dead and static, but coming into being in continuous self-formation before our 
eyes.” Also: “Music is a kind of kaleidoscope […] Music produces beautiful forms and colours 
in ever more elaborate diversity, gently overflowing, sharply contrasted, always coherent and 
yet always new, self-contained and self-fulfilled” (29). He qualified this analogy 
(inconsistently) by admitting that “by contrast with arabesque, music is actually a picture, but 
one whose subject we cannot grasp in words and subsume under concepts” (30). Still, he 
seriously begged the question by rendering the distinction between visual ornamentality, which 
is “no more than a mechanically ingenious plaything,” and musical ornamentality, which is an 
exalted human achievement, in terms of the latter’s being a “direct emanation of an artistic 
spirit” (29).  
 
Kivy (1993a, 348) seized upon this conception, dubbing it “the wallpaper model,” and boldly 
suggested that we bite the bullet: we should retain the consistency of Kant’s original insight, 
which the comparison with wallpaper means to uncompromisingly make plain, that “music, 
indeed, possesses no content. It is pure, empty decoration: arabesque.” Elsewhere (1993a, 360–
373) he went even further by arguing that pure instrumental music is not an art in the sense of 
that term most likely to be applied to it in the present day, that is, as a fine art. 
 
However, by focusing here on understanding pure instrumental music in terms of musical 
ornamentality, we do not wish to endorse or pursue the formalist agenda. To anticipate, 
Walton’s theory affords a much richer conceptual framework for the discussion of musical 
ornamentality. At this point, we would like to argue that the idea of musical ornamentality 




enables the opening up of a continuous rich spectrum between what we earlier dubbed Tibby-
type listening, that is, the kind of musical understanding which typifies the formalist, and 
Helen-type listening, that is, the kind of musical understanding which typifies the narrativist. In 
order to do this, we first need to bracket the historical issue concerning the status of music as a 
fine art, and to dissociate the discussion of musical ornamentality from the formalist agenda. 
 
Kivy’s historical line of argument4 is that the notion of a fine art was secured in the eighteenth 
century upon the formation of the modern system of fine arts,
5
 and that its application to music 
rested on the idea of an essentially representational practice. Subsequent philosophy of art was 
bound to struggle with the implications of this theory-laden inclusion of pure instrumental 
music in the modern system of the arts. In reading history in this way, Kivy’s strategy is clear: 
To prompt a re-evaluation of prevailing narrativist proclivities in contemporary Anglophone 
philosophy of music. 
 
There are two good reasons for bracketing (for the purpose of our present discussion) the 
historical issue concerning the establishment of music’s status as fine art and its ensuing 
prestige. The first reason is that these are matters on which the account of musical 
ornamentality per se can remain agnostic. The second reason is that the problem, raised by Kivy 
may be quite overstated, as Philip Alperson suggested, if there is another way of understanding 
the notion of the fine arts (as arts of beauty rather than arts of imitative play), which could 
accommodate musical ornamentality or even both musical representation and musical 
ornamentality at the same time. 
 
There is yet another reason for dissociating the discussion of musical ornamentality from the 
formalist agenda: the splicing of these two distinct philosophical strata in the first place was the 
result of an unnecessary fixation on the visual analogue of the arabesque, a too-literal 
application of Kant’s rather pedestrian example. Kivy’s own meditation on a Persian carpet is 
quite telling in this regard.
6
 The example is cleverly calculated to show precisely what the 
enhanced formalist needs to say: That music is a multidimensional (i.e., polyphonic), quasi-
syntactic, and ultimately deeply expressive and deeply moving pattern. Still the arabesque 
model is neither the only nor even the primary non-musical analogue for musical ornamentality; 
and more importantly, in some instances of musical ornamentality this model is plainly not the 
right kind. 
 
According to Alperson (1992, 220), “we can find decorative elements within each of the major 
musical categories of Western instrumental music of melody, harmony and rhythm.” Such 
instances of musical ornamentality run the gamut from local devices such as trills, turns, grace 
notes, tremolos, and flourishes, through various means of embellishment of melodic passages 
and of rhythm, to phrasing accents and timbral manipulations, and ultimately to larger 
compositional practices. “In fact,” Alperson (1992, 220) submits, “whole musical styles – and 
thus the history of musical taste and appreciation – may be understood, if not identified, in large 
part by reference to decorative practice.” 
 
It is important to observe that most of the examples in this vast array of musical phenomena 
actually fall outside of the arabesque model. The gist of the arabesque model is the idea of 
sequentiality, as shown in Kivy’s use of the Persian carpet example to flesh out his account of 
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repetition in classical form. However, not all instances of musical ornamentality are explicable, 
neatly or even at all, in terms of sequentiality. For example, short trills, turns, grace notes and 
their ilk are all local phenomena which have no bearing on musical structure. They decorate in 
the most straightforward sense, and more often than not they can be removed in performance 
without significant musical loss. The cadenza, which is ornamental with respect to the work as a 
whole, is patently external to the formal plan of the piece. This is most clear where the cadenza 
has been composed by someone other than the original composer of the concerto, or is 
improvised by the performer. 
 
More complex counterexamples can be found in certain calculated uses of such ornamental 
devices as accelerando and ritardando to undermine sequentiality by way of surprise. For 
example, in the second movement of Beethoven's Piano Sonata No. 31 in A-flat major, op. 110, 
the restatement of the opening theme in measures 96–111 is varied with ritard and a tempo 
markings in its second appearance. One cannot predict this change in tempo since both the 
antecedent and the consequent phrases return completely and identically, hence they are readily 
referred to the original statement of the material. Thus, the embellishment of the tempo in the 
second repetition turns out to be an unexpected interruption, which in effect weakens the sense 
of sequentiality altogether. 
 
Other instances of musical ornamentality are profoundly a matter of musical practice, products 
of cultural and social conditions. Consider, for example, the basso continuo in the musical 
practice of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This is a bass line with appended 
accidentals and numbers (“figures”) that provides the harmonic outline in many of the musical 
compositions of the Baroque era. Execution of this characteristic notation assumes the 
proficiency of the player in conveying the “coded information” by realization of the symbols. 
However, although the symbols may designate particular forms of harmony, they do not 
prescribe a fixed distribution of the voices. The role of the accompanist is to “fit to each piece a 
correct performance of its harmony in the proper volume and with a suitable distribution of 
tones” (Bach [1753/1787] 1949, 174). The practice of basso continuo also encourages the 
performer to reach beyond the score in the sense of refining the accompaniment with 
embellishments and varied imitations which are based on the motivic material.  
 
The accompanist needs to practice discretion in striking a good measure of variability against 
the principal part while avoiding tedious repetition. Even more importantly, he needs to practice 
discretion in identifying the uniqueness of a certain piece and designing its appropriate 
accompaniment for the particular occasion of its performance. For instance, he needs to take 
into consideration the circumstances of the performance, its location and audience, and the size 
of the ensemble. Consequently, the execution of basso continuo may vary in each performance; 
it is dependent on the judgment and skill of the accompanist. In sum, to account for the 
ornamental practice of the basso continuo, we must acknowledge the crucial role played by the 
accompanist in the compositional process, finalizing and determining a musical composition in 
accord with its contemporary performance practice. In this case, compositional decisions taken 
by the performer need not follow a pure compositional method, but rather bring together 
practice and method. The arabesque model of musical ornamentality falls short of explaining 
such quintessential cases of musical ornamentality. 
 
The rich variety of musical ornamentality is hardly surprising considering the enormous scope 
of non-musical ornamentality, which encompasses all kinds of objects and practices, from 
tapestries to the sleek contours of race cars, from glass-blowing to bodily modification, from 
interior decoration to social decorum. It is important to observe that in many such cases, the 




ornamental aspect of such objects or practices is perfectly compatible with full-fledged 
mimesis. If we consider such objects and practices as ornamental, it is not because they each 
have a certain form, but because they impinge on our way of living in a certain form. So to look 
for the point of such ornamental objects and practices is to ask how they mesh with our life. 
One is not likely to take this to be the point of musical ornamentality if one takes the arabesque 
to be one’s paradigmatic example. 
 
Having cleared up these issues, we may now return to the musicologist’s intuition:  
 
[I]n music as in the other arts (verbal, filmic, literary, painterly) aspects of agency are not 
continuously displayed, nor are aspects of narration. Both are only intermittently 
operative. Even the most “expressive” music […] at times simply swirls or dreams or 
chugs along in its decorative function. But in this it is essentially no different from 
painting and literature. It may differ from them only in the balance of these functions. 
(Newcomb 1997, 133; emphasis in original) 
 
In effect, Anthony Newcomb introduces here what we would dub “the Tibby-Helen 
continuum,” that is, the idea that musical ornamentality (sans formalism) and narrativism not 
only are not mutually exclusive, they are in fact mutually permeable, continuous with each 
other, and complementary.  
 
The balance of these functions may differ across the musical repertoire, across different styles 
and performance practices of pure instrumental music, and even across various renditions of a 
given musical work, invoking a need to take into account the audiences and traditions to which 
they appeal as well as what Alperson (2008) recently called “the instrumentality of music” – a 
richly layered understanding of the art of music in terms of culturally and historically situated 
practices of human beings. Thus, we are inclined to accept Alperson’s suggestion that 
 
we may want to think about instrumental music as encompassing a continuum, from 
music which approaches the limit, on the one hand, of a pure art of decoration, to music 
which approaches the limit of full-blown imitation on the other. (Alperson 1992, 227) 
 
Kivy (2009, 131–139) raised a couple of general objections to Newcomb’s original suggestion 
to consider such a continuum. To complete our move in this section of our essay, we shall now 
answer these objections. Kivy’s first objection is that the very idea of such a continuum patently 
begs the question about the narrative content of pure instrumental music: “[U]nless one simply 
assumes that absolute music has agents and narrative content […] one cannot argue about the 
degree to which it has them” (Kivy 2009, 134; emphasis in original). However, if the 
continuum concerns modes of listening (broadly construed as modes of human engagement 
with music or musical phenomena), and if we can admit a posteriori that narrative content is 
possible, as Stephen Davies (2003) suggested, then Kivy (1993b, 23) has already conceded that 
he “cannot, in a non-question-begging way, rule out ‘impure’ listening, tout court, as being 
listening not ‘of the work.’” In other words, Helen is here to stay. 
 
Kivy’s second objection derives its logical force from the Sorites paradox, as Kivy moves to 
establish that the very idea of a continuum in this case is a non sequitur. If the continuum is a 
matter of how much narrative content it possesses, then, according to Kivy (2009, 134), “that is 
perfectly consistent with its having, as the formalist insists, none at all, just as the bald man 
possesses zero degree of hair.” However, the appeal to the Sorites paradox is actually 
unwarranted here given the inherent vagueness of the concepts under discussion. These 




concepts are irrevocably derived from ordinary language. This is clearly the case even with 
regard to the foundational concepts of musical formalism itself. Heinrich Schenker (1954 
[1906], 6), for example, construed the very concept of repetition by means of an analogy with 
the procreative urge of living creatures. In the final analysis, Kivy’s second objection is a red 
herring. Thus we pre-empt Kivy’s objections to the Tibby-Helen continuum. 
 
 
3. Musical ornamentality as impurely musical make-believe 
 
We are now set to address the first question we posed in our introduction to this essay – can 
Walton’s theory of make-believe accommodate the Tibby-Helen continuum? – and also to 
answer it in the affirmative. The kind of musical make-believe that we wish to explore here is 
impure in two different senses. It is patently impure in the formalist’s sense, as Kivy had argued 
(1990, 42–67). This need not disturb our present discussion. It is also impure in a particularly 
Waltonian sense, because it impinges on Walton’s characterization of music (in Mimesis as 
Make-Believe and elsewhere) as an art of imaginative introspection. This is where we propose 
to read Walton’s theory against the grain. We believe that Walton’s characterization of music 
can be resisted on independent philosophical as well as musicological grounds, but we shall 
leave that for another occasion. Our point is that his theory of make-believe nonetheless allows 
the kind of move that we propose here, and as we shall see, Walton himself actually approached 
such ideas at one point, although he never developed this any further. 
 
In Mimesis as Make-Believe Walton (274–289) offered an intriguing account of ornamentality 
in terms of psychologically inhibited games of make-believe. This account has received 
surprisingly little attention in the literature, and to the best of our knowledge, it has never been 
applied to music. According to Walton, ornamental works belong to the category of 
representations that positively discourage participation, especially the psychological 
participation that would constitute the experience of being caught up in a story. Works are 
ornamental insofar as they inhibit or interrupt certain imaginings. Such representations 
deliberately distance the appreciator from the fictional world or even hinder the imagining of 
what is fictional, effectively undercutting appreciators’ roles as reflexive props. In such cases, 
Walton contends,  
 
our stance is more akin to that of an onlooker than a participant in games of make-believe, 
although that we “observe” is not someone’s actually playing a game but rather the kind 
of game that might be played. We step back and examine the prop, contemplating the 
games it might inspire and the role it would have in them. We may marvel at a work’s 
suitability for use in games of certain sorts; we may be fascinated by the combination of 
fictional truths it generates (this amounts to an interest in the work world); we may 
admire the artist’s skill and ingenuity in devising ways of generating fictional truths; we 
may delight in the devices by which participation is inhibited. (Walton 1990, 275) 
 
Walton usefully explicated his notion of ornamentality as psychologically inhibited games of 
make-believe by suggesting that ornamentality consists in fictional worlds in which other 
fictional worlds are embedded. Embedding a fictional world within another one puts it at a 
certain emotional “distance” from us. According to Walton (1990, 287), the first-order world, 
that is, the world of the framing game, “is frequently very sparse, consisting of scarcely more 
than the work itself together with, by implication, its artist and his creative activity, and inviting 
minimal participation.” Our participation is in this first-order game of make-believe:  
 




In participating in it we may imagine that there is another game which we could 
participate in […] But imagined participation is not actual participation, and imagined 
participation, let alone imagining merely that there is a game to participate in, does not 
constitute involvement in a fictional world. We stand apart from the internal fictional 
world and observe it through its frame. (Walton 1990, 284) 
 
Walton’s theoretical structuring of psychologically inhibited games of make-believe as 
consisting of two game-worlds, one embedded in or framed by another, makes his theory of 
ornamentality particularly proximate to the Tibby-Helen continuum. The rudiment of a 
continuum or a sliding scale is already in place. According to Walton, the inhibitions wherein 
ornamentality subsists are usually partial and the interruptions are temporary, and different 
ornamental elements may differ in their capacity to inhibit participation. Also, according to 
Walton (1990, 283), ornamental works remain genuine representations: “Their ornamentality 
merely alters what they are representations of.” The two game-worlds may interrupt or interfere 
with each other, and they generally interpenetrate. In some cases, their juxtaposition might even 
be the point of the piece. On the whole, Walton maintains that ornamentality coexists with full-
fledged mimesis; it is an aesthetic phenomenon which is much more widespread in art and in 
life than we tend to acknowledge. 
 
We can neatly map the two poles of the Tibby-Helen continuum onto Walton's dual-game 
formation. Let us be reminded that E. M. Forster’s delightful characters, Tibby and Helen, serve 
here as idealized placeholders for different modes of human engagement with music or musical 
phenomena. The kind of game in which Tibby, “who is profoundly versed in counterpoint, and 
holds the full score open on his knee” (Forster 1963 [1910], 31), participates while listening to 
Beethoven’s fifth symphony exemplifies Walton's first-order game-world which includes the 
work (the symphony) and, by implication, the artists (the composer and the performers) and 
their creative activities. In the limiting case, the point of Tibby’s game may very well be merely 
to delight in the devices by which participation is inhibited. This may indeed correspond to 
Kivy’s description of the “empty pleasure” of absolute music. But, as Walton pointed out, the 
point of such games ordinarily extend to appreciating how suitable the work is for use in games 
of certain sorts and for generating fictional truths as we appreciate the compositional ingenuity 
and the performing skills in devising ways for generating such fictional truths. So, beyond the 
limiting case, Tibby’s game is all about reaching out to the second-order world, to the 
embedded game-world, Helen’s game, in which it is fictionally true that she see heroes and 
shipwrecks in the music’s flood. The Tibby-Helen continuum stretches perpendicularly from 
the framing game of make-believe into the game-worlds embedded therein. 
 
It is important to note why Helen’s use of Beethoven’s symphony is not illicit. She sees heroes 
and shipwrecks in the music’s flood, which means that she has not forgotten about the primary, 
framing world. She does not mistake the internal, second-order game-world for the primary, 
framing world, as though it were the world of the work. Helen-type listening does not amount to 
using the work as a prop in a way in which it is only fictional that it is to be used.
7
 Only in the 
limiting case would Helen-type listening indeed be listening “not of the work” in this sense. 
This dialectic of temptation and resistance fleshes out the idea of artistic recalcitrance pertaining 
to the musical material and its promise of artistic achievement. Certain musical works tend to 
inhibit more; hence they require some effort to achieve vivid imagining, which might be 
essential for playing the piece with musical understanding. Other works tend to inhibit less; 
hence they require some effort to achieve distance, which might be essential for a musically 
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balanced performance.  
 
The very idea of recalcitrance in this context underscores aspects of what Philip Alperson 
(2008) calls “the instrumentality of music.” Alperson argues for a rich ontology of musical 
instruments which accommodates their understanding as musically, conceptually, and culturally 
situated; the musical instrument “as an amalgam of material object, the performer's body, and 
bodily dispositions as habituated by the developments of various musically related skills” (46). 
Accordingly, Alperson contends, 
 
the performance of musical works is a kind of musical practice in which the object of 
aesthetic appreciation is legitimately regarded as the work-in-performance. That is, there 
is a kind of double consciousness of the performance as a performance of the work as a 
musical entity and of the performer’s achievement in performing the work. (Alperson 
2008, 47) 
 
We would like to suggest that the artistic recalcitrance afforded by the Tibby-Helen continuum 
(as seen from the vantage point of Walton’s theory of ornamentality) exemplifies precisely this 
sort of experience of “twofoldness.” 
 
One type of example of the artistic challenge involving what we may dub “Helen-to-Tibby 
recalcitrance” is found whenever we encounter what music critics often call “cerebral” or 
“analytic” renditions of otherwise highly expressive works, for example Tchaikovsky’s 
“Pathétique” symphony. Familiarity with the tonal idiom, format, and rhetoric of such works 
may render them significantly more apt to be experienced “from within,” in Walton’s sense.8 
Yet a musician may wish to do more than offer listeners means of expressing feelings or 
emotions. A conductor might want us to experience the first movement of the “Pathétique” 
symphony not just as an expression of conflicting emotions, ours or someone else’s (a musical 
persona, perhaps), but also as an ingenious symphonic structure. He may show ingenious 
artistic skill precisely in inhibiting or interrupting the listeners’ ability to lose themselves in any 
second-order fictional world beyond their initial appropriation of the musical sounds. He might 
hold back a little the tempo of the third movement, a defiant march, in order to let the inner 
voices and overlapping textures shine through. Such a finely balanced performance would 
unequivocally show an artistic interest in reflexivity, in the means by which participation is 
promoted and the kinds of participation one might engage in. For the price of lacking a certain 
kind of passion in Tchaikovsky, one would gain a fuller understanding of how the music works 
by being geared toward concrete aspects of the actual performance. Walton contends (1990, 
288–289) that this is in general one of the great cognitive values of ornamentality. 
 
The converse category of “Tibby-to-Helen recalcitrance” is even more illuminating. In such 
cases, if the music is to work at all, reflexivity must give way to, and in effect coexist with, 
vivid imagining. A relatively simple example is the long trill. Among musical embellishments, 
the long trill has a special function: the prolongation of a long note. Keyboard instruments are 
not capable of sustaining long notes or modifying their dynamic level once the action of striking 
the key has been completed. In his definitive treatise on keyboard techniques, Essay on the True 
Art of Playing Keyboard Instruments (first part published in 1753; second part in 1787), Carl 
Philipp Emanuel Bach (1949 [1753/1787], 150) argued that the “empty space” may result in a 
“consequent monotony due to a lack of sonority.” If the score calls for a long note in either the 
upper or the lower voice, then the long trill is commonly regarded (even where it is not actually 
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specified in the score) as a suitable way for the performer to compensate for the acoustic 
limitations of the instrument so that “the listener will believe that he is hearing only the original 
note” (Bach 1949 [1753/1787], 150). 
 
This example shows the prevalence and importance of the idea of enhancement for any 
complete theoretical understanding of musical ornamentality. The idea of enhancement, which 
was urged upon Kendall Walton by Patrick Maynard (1991; Walton 1991, 416–420), pertains to 
cases in which an ornament induces imaginings which direct and vivify one’s perception of the 
thing ornamented. In the case of the long trill, the thing ornamented is the “empty space,” which 
the long note prefigures. Thus the imaginings, which the long trill induces, facilitate the 
listener’s grasp of the unfolding of the phrase’s structure. 
 
Importantly, the idea of enhancement emphasizes the roles actual things – their physical 
features as well as their functions – play in make-believe, and other ways in which fiction and 
reality are intertwined. No less important is the idea that enhancement may coexist with 
reflexivity. That is, focusing attention on the physical properties of an object apart from their 
role in generating fictional truths may still vivify imaginings concerning that object. It is 
noteworthy that Walton (1991, 417) has actually acknowledged that “enhancement of the kind 
Maynard has in mind is especially important in music, in the ornamentation or embellishment 
or elaboration of melodies or motives. There is much to be done in the way of explaining what 
the enhancement of an ornamented melody consists in, and what role imaginings have in the 
process.” To the best of our knowledge, Walton never developed this idea, or any of its 
theoretical implications, in his published writings. 
 
Another important result of Maynard’s suggestion is the extension of Walton’s notion of 
ornamentality to include ornamenting or decorating in the transitive sense (the decoration of 
actual things in our environment). We can comment on this only very briefly here. In such 
cases, Walton (1991, 417) agrees, “one’s attention is likely to be drawn to the thing decorated 
and to the relation of the decoration to it, and this might distract one from full participation in a 
game with the decorating representation.” This extension significantly opens up the discussion 
of musical ornamentality to accommodate important questions concerning how music meshes 
with our social reality. For instance, Ernst Gombrich pointed out that music may follow the 
laws of social decorum in ways analogous to cases of symbolism in visual decoration. 
Gombrich wrote:  
 
The minuet, the hymn, the pastoral, the aria, are all associated with moods which the 
composer can accept of modify much as the decorator can treat the music room, the 
boudoir, or the garden house by accepting or flouting conventions. (Gombrich 1979, 301) 
 
These are aspects of the musical work-in-performance which call for further exploration in the 
framework of Walton’s theory of ornamentality.   
 
The case of the long trill clearly shows that enhancement in music, even in the simplest case, is 
indispensable, as opposed to the crude example of the sort of automobile decorations that 
induce us to imagine that a car is fast (color stripes, trim, or simply the styling of the body). In 
the latter case, if we remove the embellishment, it would be more difficult, yet still quite 
possible, to imagine that this car is fast. The embellishment is merely “stuck on” what it 
decorates. In the case of the long trill, if we remove it, then it will be quite impossible to 
imagine that the long note persists. An aural gap will remain in the middle of the music. The 
performance will simply fail.  





The indispensability of embellishments in music received an elaborate theoretical defense 
across the board in C. P. E. Bach’s Essay on the True Art of Playing Keyboard Instruments. 
Bach (1949 [1753/1787], 79) suggested considering the many uses of embellishments for 
enhancement (in the sense explored here): “They connect and enliven tones and impart stress 
and accent; they make music pleasing and awaken our close attention. Expression is heightened 
by them; let a piece be sad, joyful, or otherwise, and they will lend a fitting assistance.” He 
argued that “embellishments provide opportunities for fine performance as well as much of its 
subject matter. They improve mediocre compositions. Without them the best melody is empty 
and ineffective, the clearest content clouded” (79). Importantly, there is a natural emphasis in 
Bach’s argument on the idea that the indispensability of embellishments is not merely a matter 
of the formal properties of the music, but rather enables us to appreciate music as work-in-
performance, in Alperson’s (2008) sense. 
 
Another, strikingly different example of enhancement is found in Arnold Schoenberg’s Piano 
Piece op. 11, no. 1 (see Fig. 1). One of the most distinct characteristics of common-practice 
tonality is its ability to convey the sense of directed motion toward a goal. This goal is achieved 
through a “cadence,” a closing formula which contributes to the affirmation of tonality. 
Schoenberg’s “emancipation of the dissonance” in such works as his Piano Piece op. 11, no. 1 
yields an abundance of unresolved dissonances, which obscure the tonal center. As Schoenberg 
(1975, 134) himself admitted, when tonality is thus abandoned, “the necessity for fortifying the 
key may be questioned.” Schoenberg argued that in such cases the recalling of tonal centers 
would not compensate for the absence of directed motion. Yet he also argued that unity and 
coherence cannot be achieved solely by means of tonality:  
 
[T]here are other laws that music obeys, apart from these [i.e., the laws of sound at the 
origin of tonality] and the laws that result from the combination of time and sound: 
namely, those governing the working of our minds. This latter forces us to find a 




Figure 1. Arnold Schönberg, 3 Klavierstücke für Klavier, op. 11/1 
 © Copyright 1995 by Wiener Urtext Edition, Musikverlag Ges.m.b.H.   & Co., K.G., Wien/UT 
50195 
 
Schoenberg (1995, 249) approached the cadence in its role as “restoration of the state of rest.” 
He maintained that when tonal means are unavailable, this state of rest can be restored by other 
means of articulation. In op. 11, no. 1, Schoenberg replaced the harmonic cadence by 
ritardando and langsamer markings that served as means of punctuation so that beginning and 
ending could be clearly delimited. In effect, the embellishment of tempo carries the musical 
rhetoric of the piece. The performer must vividly imagine closure for the music to work. 
Schoenberg’s atonal idiom in this piece palpably makes enhancement musically indispensable. 
If we remove the embellishment of tempo, that is, if we fail to make the gesture in performance, 
or if we refuse to imagine that this is closure, then the music is bound to fail. We maintain that 
this sort of enhancement by means of gesture is vital to many other contemporary musical 
idioms and underlie a mode of listening which is conducive to the appreciation of such music, 
one which unsympathetic listeners often refuse to engage in. 
 
Another example is needed in order to show a distinguishing case: the advent of “Tibby-to-




Helen recalcitrance” which does not involve enhancement. Consider Frédéric Chopin’s piano 
etude op. 10, no. 6 (see Fig. 2). This piece calls our immediate attention to its highly chromatic 
harmony. It displays a four-part polyphonic texture with chromatic sixteenth-note figuration 
occurring within the inner voices. The intricateness of the polyphonic structure, together with 
the presence of decorative semi-tonal movement, leads to increased tension among all four 
layers. This creates a “centrifugal force” which drives the large-scale tonal plan of the piece 
toward distant tonal relationships.
9
 The extended function of the chromatic figuration ultimately 
re-defines the performer’s considerations. Normally, performing an etude requires special 
attention to a particular technical challenge. A successful performance of the etude amounts to 
the attainment of a pre-assigned goal in the performer’s learning process. However, in this 
particular etude, the ornamental figuration is not merely a subtle accompaniment which only 
requires advanced playing technique; rather, the figuration also significantly intensifies the tonal 
motion, the continuity, and the overall tension of the piece. Without it, only a bare harmonic 
skeleton is left, marked by reduced tension and motion. Without it, the ground for remote tonal 
relationships in the large-scale tonal plan weakens significantly. 
 
 
Figure 2. Frederic Chopin, 12 Etudes, op. 10/6 
 © Copyright 1973, 2005 by Wiener Urtext Edition, Musikverlag Ges.m.b.H.   & Co., K. G., 
Wien/UT 50205 
 
In this piece, the particular artistic challenge for the performer is to move beyond the normal 
focus in this genre on technique, and hence to reconsider the expressive range of his playing. 
This artistic challenge pertains to “Tibby-to-Helen recalcitrance” in the sense that expressive 
playing in this piece presupposes reflexivity: Acute awareness of the broad effect of the 
chromatic figuration on harmonic motion, tonal tension, and the large-scale tonal plan – the 
areas which, in the genre of the etude, patently inhibit psychological participation. Such 
reflexivity determines an expressive form of playing which enables the performer to clearly 
distinguish the different layers from one another while emphasizing the tense interaction among 
them as well. 
 
 
4. Musical ornamentality and thoughtwriting 
 
From the vantage point of Walton’s theory of onrnamentality as psychologically inhibited 
games of make-believe, the gist of musical ornamentality is reflexivity. Ornamentality curtails 
imaginative immersion in a work-world as it deflects the appreciator back to the world of a 
framing game, which consists of the work itself together with the performer and his creative 
activity, and by implication also the composer (if he is not also the performer) and his creative 
activity. We suggested that the reflexivity pertaining to musical ornamentality involves a kind 
of double consciousness (or twofoldness) of the musical performance as a performance of the 
work as musical entity and of the performer’s achievement in performing the work. We also 
suggested that deflecting back to the framing world-game – that is, becoming interested in the 
means by which imaginative participation is promoted and the kinds of participation one might 
engage in – involves the appreciation of significant connections with our social environment 
and with our lives. Importantly, such double consciousness pertains not only to the impurely 
musical make-believe of the performer but also to that of the (non-performing) listener. As 
Walton suggested long ago (1987, 78), the listener’s appreciation involves some sort of 
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empathy with the act of making the sounds. That is, appreciation by performing is primary even 
when we refer to the experience of a (non-performing) listener. 
 
We can now turn to the second question, which we posed in the introduction to our essay – how 
may this conception of musical ornamentality intervene in the current formalist-narrativist 
debate concerning the problem of absolute music? In the previous sections of our essay, we 
carefully traced and explicated the situation. Paying one last tribute to our loyal literary 
pathfinders, Tibby and Helen, we can put matters succinctly: Tibby and Helen can be seen as 
belonging with each other in the sense that Helen’s introspectively imaginative game-world is 
framed (and psychologically inhibited) by Tibby’s reflexive yet imaginatively enhancing game-
world; musical ornamentality consists in the mutual, two-way artistic recalcitrance which 
traverses this dual-world formation. This dynamic theoretical construal of musical 
ornamentality steers clear of both the Scylla of formalism and the Charybdis of the persona 
theory.  
 
It is time to place the last piece in our theoretical puzzle. In a recent paper entitled 
“Thoughtwriting – In Poetry and Music,” Walton (2011) advanced a different literary model for 
understanding musical experience. Walton is now suggesting that music and music-making can 
frequently be understood in terms of what he dubs “thoughtwriting,” that is, as “texts” which 
are composed “for others to use in expressing their thoughts (feelings, attitudes)” (455). The 
paradigmatic example for thoughtwriting, Walton argues (468–469), is lyric poetry, which, in 
contrast to novels, for instance, is especially likely to express thoughts or ideas in a manner that 
the reader will find particularly apt for his expression. Thus he means to deflect not only the 
idea of hypothetical narrators and musical personae, whose prevalence and importance in 
music, he believes, “have been seriously exaggerated” (459) but also reduce the prominence of 
novels or stories (hence the prominence of the notion of “storytelling”) in the explanation of 




“Poetry and music,” Walton contends, “are strikingly similar in their propensity to function as 
thoughtwriting,” (473). Thoughtwriting in music requires that we follow along, thinking the 
music as we listen. “In ‘performing’ music in these ways,” he writes, “listeners are likely to be 
using the sounds (the sound types, anyway, or tokens of the types they hear) to express their 
own feelings or emotions, or feelings or emotions they try on, ones they experience at least in 
imagination” (470). 
 
Yet Walton does not offer any conception for a mechanism of appropriation for music. If music 
is a perceptual art (in contrast to literature [Walton 1990, 334]), then the application of Walton’s 
new literary model to music calls for an elaboration of such a mechanism. The very idea of 
musical performance as some sort of “text” which is presented for others to use for their own 
expression requires further explication. We maintain that a suitable conception for a mechanism 
of appropriation for Walton’s new idea of thoughtwriting in music is actually ready at hand in 
our present suggestion to explain musical ornamentality as psychologically inhibited games of 
make-believe. In order to clearly distinguish Walton’s idea of appropriation in music from cases 
of mere arousal of thoughts (feelings, attitudes) by means of music, Walton’s notion of 
appropriation in music requires the sort of reflexivity which we expounded in the previous 
section of this paper. To appropriate musical sound, to be able to utilize it, would necessitate 
some reflexive know-how. Of course, this seems quite trivial when we think of thoughtwriting 
in the case of a listener who happens to be also the actual performer of the music.  
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Our suggestion complements and completes Walton’s recent idea of thoughtwriting in music in 
the following ways. It underscores the full import of music as a performing art by locating the 
germ of thoughtwriting in the double consciousness of the performance as a performance of the 
work as a musical entity and of the performer’s achievement in performing the work. This 
significantly expands and enriches the scope of what we may regard as the “text” offered for 
appropriation in musical performances. The sound offered for appropriation is imbued with 
understanding of the circumstances of its introduction into the listener’s life. That is, the 
impression the musical sound makes on us is connected with “the whole range of our language 
games,” as Wittgenstein (1980, 51–52) put it. This is particularly true when complex 
phenomena such as tunes, rhythmic patterns, and musical gestures are presented for possible 
use by the listener or performer, as the examples from Schoenberg and Chopin in the previous 
section show. It also accounts for differences in thoughtwriting across different types of music, 
and across different types of listeners. Ultimately, such a contextually rich conception of 
thoughtwriting undercuts the force of the standard formalist charge of begging the question 
about the purported meaning of pure instrumental music.  
 
Finally, our suggestion pulls together Walton’s insight in Mimesis as Make-Believe that the 
psychological distance afforded by ornamentality “makes for less direct but more significant 
connections with our lives” (288) and his recent idea of experiencing something “from within,” 
of making an expression our own, thinking the music that we hear assertively ourselves.
11
 
Conceived in terms of musical ornamentality, as we suggest, the appropriation of musical sound 
may yield thoughts that connect us to the world in multifarious ways. In contradistinction to 
formalism and to persona-theory narrativism, the ultimate point of impurely musical make-
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